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1. Introduction
As is well known, several English advocates of early modern experimental philosophy posited
a strong connection between religion and experimental philosophy. According to Robert 
Boyle, Joseph Glanvill and Thomas Sprat, by practising experimental philosophy we can shed
light on God’s attributes,1 will and providence (B 11: 298–299). We can draw on the 
discoveries of experimental philosophers to prove the existence of God and spirits,2 refute 
atheism, materialism, superstition and religious enthusiasm,3 and distinguish authentic 
miracles from fake miracles (ibid., 316). The practice of experimental philosophy leads to the 
worship of God4 and embodies the Christian virtues of humility, innocence and piety.5
In the light of this, early modern experimental philosophy might seem to corroborate 
the view that the study of nature in the seventeenth century was closely related to theology, 
driven by theological concerns, and pursued primarily to shed light on God. This view has 
been put forward by Amos Funkenstein, Stephen Gaukroger and Andrew Cunningham. 
According to Funkenstein (1986, 72), a ‘fusion between theology and physics’ took place in 
the seventeenth century. ‘Theological and physical arguments became nearly 
indistinguishable’ (ibid., 73). ‘[S]cience’ and ‘theology’ were ‘seen as one and the same 
occupation’.6 For Gaukroger (2006, 3), ‘the Scientific Revolution’ was ‘driven, often 
explicitly, by religious considerations’. In the seventeenth century, ‘Christianity took over 
natural philosophy’ (Gaukroger 2006, 22), ‘set the agenda for natural philosophy’, ‘projected 
2it forward’ (ibid., 3) and ‘establish[ed]’ it ‘as something in part constructed in the image of 
religion’ (ibid., 22). Cunningham holds that natural philosophers, in the seventeenth century 
as in other periods, ‘explored’ nature ‘not for itself’, but only insofar as it was God’s creation. 
They aimed to shed light on ‘God’s achievements, God’s intentions, God’s purposes, God’s 
messages to man’ (Cunningham 1988, 384).7 On the one hand, ‘each and every variety of 
natural philosophy that was put forward was an argument for particular and specific views of 
God’ (Cunningham 1991, 382). On the other hand, differences in religious outlook led natural 
philosophers to entertain ‘somewhat differing concepts’ of how God’s ‘nature can be seen or 
uncovered’ (ibid., 389).8
In this chapter I argue that, unlike many of their English peers, practitioners and 
advocates of experimental philosophy in seventeenth-century Italy kept natural philosophy 
sharply distinct from theological and religious concerns.9 Negatively, the case of Italian 
experimental philosophers provides a counterexample to the view that either experimental 
philosophy or seventeenth-century natural philosophy, as a whole, were fused with theology, 
driven by theological concerns, or pursued primarily to shed light on God.10 Positively, the 
case of Italian experimental philosophers provides evidence for the claim that experimental 
philosophy does not bear any intrinsic connection with religion. On the contrary, as we shall 
see, certain features of the outlook of experimental philosophy made it easy to pursue it in 
isolation from theological and religious questions. Whether experimental philosophy was 
presented as an ally of religion or as distinct from it depends, at least in part, on matters of 
cultural politics, namely, which rhetorical and argumentative strategies were believed to be 
the most likely to ensure freedom of research and institutional support for the work of 
experimental philosophers.
2. Experimental Philosophy in Seventeenth-Century Italy
I understand the expression ‘experimental philosophy’ in a narrow sense, as referring to a 
3natural philosophical movement that emerged in the Royal Society in the 1660s. Seventeenth-
century experimental philosophers shared at least four common features.11 First, they 
employed a distinctive rhetoric, centred around the praise of experiment and the criticism of 
speculation, understood as the firm endorsement of natural philosophical systems without 
sufficient empirical evidence. Second, experimental philosophers had common heroes, 
especially Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle, as well as common foes: Aristotle, the 
Scholastics and, especially from the 1680s onward, Descartes, who they accused of 
speculating. Third, experimental philosophers shared a common methodological outlook. 
Negatively, they held that one should not firmly commit oneself to any substantive claims or 
theories on the natural world, unless they are warranted by extensive experiments and 
observations. Positively, they held that we should follow a two-stage process in order to make 
a firm commitment to substantive claims or theories. In the first stage, we should gather a 
large collection of empirical information by means of first-person, autoptic experiences and 
organize them in structured natural histories. In the second stage, we should derive theories 
from that information through a process of induction or deduction, whose details, however, 
were rarely specified.12 Fourth, experimental philosophers shared a broad set of attitudes: a 
concern for the practical usefulness of natural philosophy; a special receptivity to foreign or 
unusual facts and opinions; an emphasis on epistemic humility, often conjoined with a plea for
ingenuity, sincerity, and a readiness to learn from others; and a critical attitude towards 
authority, along with an emphasis on seeking the truth by oneself.
Italian authors adopted these views and attitudes surprisingly quickly.13 One can find 
them in works published as early as 1667 and 1668, Geminiano Montanari’s Physico-
Mathematical Thoughts (1667) on capillary action and Francesco Redi’s Experiments on the 
Generation of Insects (1996 [1668]). Over the following decades, the outlook of experimental
philosophy informed the activity of numerous researchers and several academies. It can be 
found, for instance, in works on crystallography (Guglielmini 1719 [1688]), geology (Scilla 
42007 [1670]) and the method of practical medicine (Baglivi 1696). Practitioners and 
apologists of experimental philosophy were active in Bologna, Naples, Tuscany (including 
both Florence and Pisa), the Venetian Republic (especially Padua) and minor centres such as 
Brescia and Verona.14
Most Italian supporters of experimental philosophy endorsed a generic form of 
corpuscularism whose primary sources were Gassendi and, to a lesser extent, Descartes. They 
held that physical phenomena should be explained in terms of the shape, size and spatial 
arrangement of the particles that make up bodies, along with the motion of such particles 
according to the laws of nature. Proudly following Galileo, Italian authors emphasized that 
God wrote those laws using geometrical characters (e.g., Anon. 1665, 32–33) and they 
sometimes claimed that we can know the natural world only by means of mathematics (Anon.
1665, 32; Montanari 1980, 542–543). Several authors carried out qualitative studies 
concerning, for instance, the ‘macroscopic and behavioural features of animal species’15 that 
did not make recourse to mathematics16 and did not rely on corpuscular ‘hypotheses on the 
basic structure of phenomena’ (Baldini 1980, 427, 450). Yet even Redi, the foremost exemplar
of this ‘superficial’ style of inquiry and of a politically cautious attitude that led him not to 
publicly endorse corpuscularism, embraced it without hesitation in a work published safely 
and anonymously in the Netherlands.17
The academies which Italian novatores convened were sometimes called academies of
experimental philosophy or described as practising experimental philosophy.18 However, 
Italian authors did not usually call themselves experimental philosophers. They preferred the 
denominations of Galileans, modern philosophers and––once they started being so identified 
by their opponents––atomists. They used the term ‘atomism’ in a broad sense, to designate a 
generic form of corpuscularism that was neutral on the question of whether matter is infinitely
divisible.19 Thus, according to Francesco D’Andrea (1995 [1685], 90), a Neapolitan apologist 
of the new philosophy, the existence or nonexistence of indivisible particles ‘has nothing to do
5with the truth’ of ‘atomism’.
Some Italian corpuscularists did not share the outlook of experimental philosophers. 
Among them are Tommaso Cornelio, who founded the Neapolitan Accademia degli 
Investiganti, and Giovanni Alfonso Borelli, a key member of the Cimento and the author of a 
seminal work on biomechanics.20 However, a large number of researchers did endorse both 
corpuscularism and experimentalism. These were not merely concurrent commitments, they 
were integrated components of an outlook that combined a corpuscular matter theory with an 
experimentalist epistemology, methodology and rhetoric.21 It is for this reason that a vocal 
opponent of the new philosophers, Giovanni Battista De Benedictis, referred to them 
interchangeably as ‘atomists’ and ‘experimentalists’ (Aletino 1694, 206–207). He criticized 
them both for reducing ‘the whole science of nature’ to ‘mere experience’ (ibid., 207) and for 
endorsing corpuscularist principles that lack evidence (ibid., 202).
The Neapolitan novatores were particularly keen to praise Descartes,22 who they 
occasionally presented as a forefather of experimental philosophy.23 Yet, even they sided with 
experimental philosophers rather than Descartes on key epistemological and methodological 
questions. Most notably, Descartes (Principles, 2, §16, CSM 1: 229–230) held that we can 
establish some truths about the natural world a priori, for instance that there is no vacuum. By
contrast, the Neapolitan Investiganti stressed that we can know the natural world only by 
relying on experience and that ‘any speculations that are not confirmed by the test of the 
sense[s] are vain’ (Anon. 1665, 27).24
3. God and Natural Philosophy
As the reception of Descartes by Italian novatores was selective, so was their reception of the 
views of English experimental philosophers. Italian writers echoed their rejection of 
authority,25 prejudices (Baglivi 1696, Part II, Ch. 5), prematurely formed systems (Baglivi 
1696, Part I, Ch. 10, Sect. 2) and speculations not supported by experience (Anon. 1665, 27); 
6their admiration of Bacon26 and Boyle27 and criticisms of Aristotle and his disciples;28 their 
praise of the senses,29 experience30 and observations, which provide ‘the only path’ to advance
our knowledge of the natural world (Porzio 1736 [1667], 324); and their view that a new, 
comprehensive natural history ought to provide a ‘solid foundation for natural philosophy’.31 
However, they did not echo their claims on the connection between experimental philosophy 
and religion. They did not present the practice of natural philosophy as an exercise in the 
cultivation of Christian virtues. They did not state that natural philosophy enables us to know 
the Creator, increase our devotion, or fight atheism. The natural philosophical works of Italian
novatores did not even sketch any arguments from design, even though the inclusion of brief 
arguments from design at least in the prefaces would have been easy and rather conventional, 
especially for works of natural history.32
I have found only two exceptions to this trend.33 The first exception is in a manuscript 
written by Francesco D’Andrea, a Neapolitan apologist of the new philosophy, to reply to the 
attacks of the Peripatetics. D’Andrea (1995 [1685], 85) suggests that corpuscularism enables 
us to ‘rise from knowledge of nature to knowledge of God, its supreme author, disposing us to
love and adore him’. It is telling that this suggestion is not fleshed out anywhere in this fifty-
page manuscript. The suggestion does not appear in any of the numerous responses by the 
Italian novatores to the two major attacks that the Peripatetics mounted against them in the 
late seventeenth century.34
The second exception can be found in a work by a Neapolitan physician, Leonardo Di 
Capua’s Opinion on the Uncertainty of Medicine (1681). At one point in his sixty-page 
critique of ancient natural philosophers (585–648), Di Capua mentions a theological argument
based on corpuscular matter theory. Thales, Anaxagoras and ‘many other’ Greek philosophers 
borrowed from the Phoenicians the view that the division of bodies into ‘extremely tiny 
particles of various sizes, shapes, positions, motions and order’ entails the existence of ‘an 
infinite omnipotence and wisdom, that is able to order matter, dispose it in so many ways, and
7communicate motion to it’ (645). Having approved of this view, Di Capua goes on to criticize 
the ancients for believing matter to be eternal, rather than being created by God.35 Di Capua 
does not dwell to explain how the existence of a divine creator of matter follows from its 
corpuscular composition, nor does he refer to that argument anywhere else in his 600-page 
long Opinion. This is significant because the Opinion is a detailed, repetitive text that tends to
dwell at length on every facet of the topics discussed.
At first sight, the treatises on molluscs, spontaneous generation and microscopical 
observations by the Jesuit Filippo Buonanni (1681, 1691a, 1691b) appear to provide a further 
exception to the silence of the novatores on the connection between experimental philosophy 
and religion. Buonanni states that, by studying molluscs and tiny animals, we can come to 
know God’s attributes (1681, 27; 1691, 34), especially his beauty, goodness, power, 
providence and wisdom.36 This leads us to love, praise and admire God.37
Buonanni’s works, however, are not a real exception to the silence of Italian novatores
on theological themes because he hardly was a true novator. His endorsement of experimental
philosophy was superficial and highly selective. He expressed admiration for the Royal 
Society and praised sense experience (Buonanni 1681, 5, 15–16), but he also defended the 
reliance of natural philosophers on authority (Buonanni 1683, 47–51). His own reliance on 
Aristotle led him to make several claims that were easily falsified by experience. For instance,
he held that molluscs lack a brain and a heart, insisting that not even with a microscope will 
one ever be able to see their hearts (Buonanni 1681, 323–324). In response, Redi detailed a 
wealth of observations of molluscs’ hearts, which can be seen not only without microscope, 
but also ‘without peeling one’s eyes’ (Redi 1684, 58). As Redi pointedly writes, Buonanni was
a ‘truly great man of letter who, [staying] at his desk, writes [only] what he found in the 
works of other authors’, but ‘not a philosophical experimenter, who affirms only what he has 
observed with his own eyes after many repeated trials’ (ibid., 63).
Perhaps the most striking example of the near absence of theological claims from the 
8works of Italian experimentalists is Giorgio Baglivi’s De praxi medica of 1696. This was one 
of the most successful medical works of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. By 
1707, the year of Baglivi’s death, it had been printed four times in three different countries38 
and it had been translated into English and German (Baglivi 1704, 1705). One of the reasons 
for the success of this book is that it outlines a method for practical medicine based on the 
tenets of experimental philosophy. Its over 250 pages are replete with experimentalist 
rhetoric. They are brimming with quotes from Bacon’s and Boyle’s works, with which Baglivi
was familiar. Yet, Baglivi does not take up any of Bacon’s or Boyle’s claims on the benefits of
the study of nature for theology (e.g., Bacon 1857, SEH 3: 597; OFB 4: 8–9). On the contrary,
he echoes Bacon’s complaint that ‘Plato’ greatly ‘damaged natural history and its progress by 
including theology in his philosophy, or judging of philosophical matters by means of 
abstract, theological concepts’ (Baglivi 1696, Part II, Ch. 2, Sect. 3).39
God makes only occasional appearances in Baglivi’s works. He calls the instinctive 
insight of the good physician a ‘divine fire’ (Baglivi 1696, Part II, Ch. 3, Sect. 5).40 He states 
that God ordered the human body according to mathematical proportions41 and subjected the 
movements of living bodies to ‘stable laws’ (ibid., Part II, Ch. 1, Sect. 1; 1715b, 453). He 
once remarks in passing that those movements show how admirable God is.42 Rather than 
being merely rhetorical, the claim that God subjected bodies to ‘stable laws’ plays a 
foundational role in Baglivi’s work. It underpins an argument for the view that diseases can be
classified into genera and species. However, Baglivi also formulates two non-theological 
arguments for that claim43 and he places little emphasis on it. He is far more interested in 
explaining how diseases can be classified than in establishing the metaphysical 
presuppositions for this activity, including the presupposition that God has ordered diseases 
into classes.
What makes Baglivi’s case interesting for our purposes is the fact that it is entirely 
standard. God plays a marginal role not only in his works, but also in those of the other 
9seventeenth-century Italian authors who were partial to experimental philosophy. Peter Dear 
(2001a, 385) has stated that, during the nineteenth century, ‘the God of science’ becomes 
‘entirely inoperative’. The same can be said of the God of experimental philosophers in 
seventeenth-century Italy. 
4. Historical Narratives and Christian Piety
There is, however, a way in which Italian novatores linked natural philosophy to religion. 
They did not claim that experimental philosophy per se promotes Christian piety. However, 
they sometimes claimed that the new philosophers were good ‘Catholics’ with an 
‘unobjectionable life’ (D’Andrea 1995 [1685], 67) and that the founding fathers of their 
corpuscular matter theory were pious too.
As Dmitri Levitin (2014, 2015) has shown, English experimental philosophers backed 
up their views on matter theory and principles by constructing historical narratives that 
stretched back to Democritus, the Indian Brahmins and the Persian Magi, drawing heavily on 
Humanist scholarship. Italian novatores constructed similar narratives to defend themselves 
from the attacks of the Aristotelians. Only one of them, the Neapolitan Giuseppe Valletta, 
wrote a fully-fledged history of philosophy. However, several other authors traced back the 
roots of corpuscular philosophy to ancient thinkers: not only Democritus and Epicurus,44 but 
also Parmenides, Timaeus,45 Plato’s dialogue Timaeus, and the prisca philosophia of the 
Egyptian priests, the Persian magi, the Indian Brahmins and gymnosophists. The latter were 
said to have taught corpuscular philosophy to Pythagoras, from whom Plato took it up.46
These narratives highlight the piety of Pythagoras, Plato, Democritus and Epicurus, 
along with the greater compatibility of their doctrines than Aristotle’s doctrines with the 
Christian faith.47 Sometimes, the pious Democritus was contrasted with the impious 
Epicurus.48 other times, they were both baptized.49
Three points are worth highlighting about these narratives that link the new 
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philosophy to religious piety. First, they were framed ex post, once the novatores came under 
attack, to address the charges of novelty and impiety raised by the Aristotelians. Second, the 
narratives were the result of historiographical and rhetorical manoeuvres that had only weak 
links with the actual contents of the new philosophy. Whether Democritus was pious or the 
gymnosophists were corpuscularists bears only a tenuous connection with whether the new 
philosophy furthered Christian piety. Third, English authors like Thomas Sprat claimed that 
the practice of experimental philosophy helps promote the Christian cause and cultivate 
Christian virtues. Italian authors resorted to historical narratives to defend a much weaker 
claim, namely, that the new philosophy and its corpuscular matter theory are acceptable to 
good Catholics. This is far less than what one would need to establish that a fusion of 
theology and physics took place among seventeenth-century Italian novatores, that 
Christianity set the agenda for their natural philosophy, or that they studied nature to shed 
light on God. 
5. Corpuscularism, Transubstantiation and the Division of Labour
In the eyes of both the Catholic Church and the Italian novatores, the most serious charge 
against them was not that they were impious, but that their corpuscular matter theory entailed 
the rejection of the dogma of transubstantiation. The incompatibility of that dogma with 
corpuscularism had been invoked on a number of occasions, including the condemnation of 
John Wycliffe’s doctrines in 1415, the Jesuit Ordinatio pro studiis superioribus of 1651, the 
decision to place Descartes’ works in the Index in 1663,50 and attacks of Peripatetics and 
Church authorities against Galileo51 and the Neapolitan corpuscularists.52 If the natural 
philosophy of the Italian novatores been theologically driven, one would expect some of them
to defend the compatibility of their corpuscularism with transubstantiation and to at least 
sketch a corpuscularist account of the Eucharist. Discussing such theological topics, even 
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within strictly natural philosophical works, was not unusual for seventeenth-century authors. 
For instance, Otto von Guericke’s Experimenta Magdeburgica on the vacuum discusses at 
some length the location of Heaven and Hell and the interpretation of the bbiblical miracle of 
Joshua who stopped the Sun.53 As far as I have been able to establish, none of the authors who
were partial to experimental philosophy sketched an account of the Eucharist, either in their 
published works or in their manuscripts.54 They claimed at most that the Eucharist is a 
mystery of faith, that ‘many things concerning the mystery of the Eucharist can hardly be 
understood’, and that ‘we do not know if there is anyone who would dare to provide a natural 
explanation of it’ (Anon. 1995b, 129).55 As one author wrote, the new philosophers did ‘not 
want to engage in disputes’ on transubstantiation. They said ‘that it is not their job to argue 
about matters of faith, because … natural philosophers should not take up the office of 
theologian or scholastic theologian’ (Anon. 1995b, 129).56
Italian authors justified this division of labour between theologians and natural 
philosophers in three ways. Giuseppe Barbari––who studied in Bologna under Montanari and 
published a treatise on vision––drew a sharp separation between the domains of natural, 
sensible beings and supernatural, non-sensible beings. According to Barbari, whoever 
acknowledges that natural philosophy relies on ‘sensate experiences’ will also acknowledge 
that a sense-based philosophy cannot shed light on ‘the insensible, supernatural things that are
object of faith’. These ought to be believed in virtue of the revelation, miracles, and the 
testimony of martyrs and ‘infinitely many people’ (Barbari 1678, v). 
Francesco Redi and Antonio Felice Marsili justified the division of labour between 
theologians and natural philosophers by noting that their disciplines require different 
epistemic attitudes. Natural philosophers should reject authority and rely on autoptic 
experience. Instead, theological matters must be believed ‘with closed eyes’ (Redi 1996 
[1668], 36),57 in virtue of the authority of God and the Church. As Marsili put it, ‘swearing in 
verba magistri is religion for theologians, stubbornness […] for [natural] philosophers. It is 
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confusing science [scienza] with faith’ (Marsili 1671, 311).58
Giuseppe Valletta, a Neapolitan apologist of the new philosophy, separated theology 
from natural philosophy by emphasizing its epistemic limitations. Natural philosophy can 
only establish probable conclusions. These are too ‘lowly and unstable foundations’ for 
matters of faith, which should be held to be certain, not just probable. It follows that faith 
cannot depend on ‘the principles of philosophies’ (Valletta 1975 [1691–1697], 164).59 
Conveniently, this entails that good Christians can embrace the new philosophy without 
prejudice to their faith.
These justifications of the division of labour between theologians and natural 
philosophers are best seen as expressions of two complementary views. On the one hand, 
Italian novatores stressed that natural philosophy must rely on reason, combined with 
experience as Bacon (OFB 11: 20) recommended.60 On the other hand, they adopted a 
fideistic outlook by denying that faith relies on reason.61 This outlook is expressed by their 
claims that the Eucharist is an incomprehensible mystery, that theological matters must be 
believed with closed eyes and that natural philosophy, which is based on reason, cannot 
ground truths of faith. These views differ sharply from Boyle’s claims that natural religion, 
based solely on reason and experience, is the ‘foundation’ of the Christian religion (B 11: 
298)62 and that, ‘by being addicted to Experimental Philosophy, a Man’ is ‘Assisted’ to be ‘a 
Good Christian’ (ibid., 281). By combining trust in reason within the realm of nature and 
distrust of reason within the realm of revelation, Italian authors drew a sharp separation 
between the mindset of the natural philosopher and that of the theologian.63
There are two disciplines in which distinguishing between the mindsets of natural 
philosophers and theologians was not sufficient to keep natural philosophy apart from 
theological matters. This is because they dealt with subjects on which the Bible was thought 
to have a say. The first discipline is the study of the history of the Earth, of which the bbiblical
flood was believed to be a chapter. Geological and paleontological discoveries lent 
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plausibility to the hypothesis that, instead of a single, worldwide flood, several local floods 
took place at different times. This was suggested, for instance, in Fabio Colonna’s pioneering 
study of fossils, De glossopetris dissertatio (1616), and in Nicholas Steno’s Canis carchariae 
(1667), the first work to propose that glossopetrae are fossilized shark teeth (Morello 2010, 
194). Yet, these works did not adopt the outlook of experimental philosophy, nor did 
Francesco Bianchini’s work on the reality of the Biblical flood (Bianchini 1697), even though 
Bianchini (1785) endorsed experimental and mechanical philosophy in his youth. The only 
seventeenth-century Italian work on paleontology or historical geology that conforms to the 
dictates of experimental philosophy is Agostino Scilla’s Vain Speculation Refuted by Sense. 
This is one of the first studies to provide detailed empirical evidence for the organic origin of 
fossils. At one point, Scilla does state that the presence of fossils in the mountains is a 
consequence of the Biblical flood and a sign of God’s power to punish people.64 However, he 
does not elaborate on this theme, nor does he speculate on when and how that flood took 
place.65 He also refers to multiple local floods66 and he often refers to ‘Nature’ in entirely 
neutral terms when he had the opportunity to invoke God.67
The second discipline that studies facts supposedly dealt with by the Bible was 
celestial mechanics. Any stance on issues bearing on the truth of the Ptolemaic, Copernican 
and Tychonic systems constrained one’s interpretation of the infamous Biblical statements on 
the motion of the Sun and one’s view on the questions of Biblical exegesis that were 
discussed in Galileo’s Copernican letters. Several followers of experimental philosophy 
carried out astronomical research, including Bianchini and his teacher Montanari, whose 
observations of the Great Comet of 1680 are referred to in Newton’s Principia (Newton 1999 
[1726], 913–915, 927). Conveniently, neither published a treatise on celestial mechanics. 
Borelli, who did publish a treatise on celestial mechanics (Borelli 1666), did not adopt the 
outlook of experimental philosophers and he did not hesitate to establish substantive truths on 
the natural world a priori.68
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The reticence of many Italian authors to discuss questions of celestial mechanics was 
at least partly due to prudential considerations.69 Geminiano Montanari refrained from 
engaging in a debate on Copernicanism because, as he put it in a manuscript, he was living in 
a place––the Papal States––where ‘one must wear a muzzle when discussing even 
uncontroversial topics’.70 Similar prudential considerations might have led Italian 
experimentalists to avoid discussing religious or theological matters. This might lead us to 
suppose that they were in fact driven by theological concerns, just like many of their English 
counterparts. If so, they concealed this through a process of self-censorship to avoid being 
accused of heterodoxy and, possibly, even being tried by the Inquisition.
There is no doubt that the Inquisition was feared, self-censorship was widespread,71 
and many Italian writers steered clear of controversial topics. Nevertheless, if theological 
concerns had been driving their natural-philosophical reflections, they could have shown it in 
a variety of ways. They could have arranged for their theological views to be published 
clandestinely, posthumously, abroad, anonymously, or under a false name. When discussing 
non-theological topics, Italian novatores resorted to each of these practices. For instance, 
Marcello Malpighi had his most trenchant criticisms of his opponents published 
posthumously (Malpighi 1697). A bitter attack on Galenist physicians by Giuseppe Gazola, 
who founded the academy of experimental philosophy of Verona, was published 
posthumously.72 The Neapolitan physician Sebastiano Bartoli had his broadside against 
Galenic physicians printed in Venice, a city that posed no obstacles to ‘the free circulation of 
printed works of all sorts’ (Ferrone 1995, 89; see Bartoli 1666). When Andrea Pissini was 
denied the permission to publish his Naturalium doctrina (1675) in Padua, he had it printed in
Augsburg. As we saw above, Redi endorsed corpuscularism in a text published anonymously 
in the Netherlands. Borelli published a reply to an argument against Copernicanism under the 
name of his pupil Diego Zerilli (Galluzzi 1977, 103, 128).
It is very plausible that, if the seventeenth-century Italian authors who favoured 
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experimental philosophy had felt strongly about theology, but were afraid of being accused of 
heterodoxy, at least some of them would have published their views posthumously, 
anonymously, abroad, or under a false name. None of them did, with only one potential 
exception: a matter-theoretical and theological essay by Domenico Guglielmini, one of the 
foremost crystallographers of the seventeenth century. The essay states that God created the 
material world, motion and its laws; ascribed extension and impenetrability to matter; 
conferred form and size to the minima; and can split them into parts. The essay was written in 
the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century and it was published posthumously in 1719. It
is unclear whether Guglielmini intended it to be published. At any rate, it is telling that this 
essay makes up only a tiny fraction of his natural-philosophical works: seven pages out of 
1343.73
Finally, if theological concerns had played a significant role in the works of the Italian 
authors who endorsed experimental philosophy, they would have had a strong incentive to 
elaborate on at least the theologically orthodox portions of their views. This would have 
helped defuse any suspicions of libertinism and it would have given additional credibility to 
their occasional professions of faith and willingness to submit to the Church (e.g., Marchetti 
1670, 1339; Scilla 2007 [1670], 5). The fact that Italian authors did not elaborate even on 
theologically safe topics provides further reason to believe that they had little interest in 
theology. 
6. Conclusion
If all this is correct, we can conclude that, pace Funkenstein, the seventeenth-century Italian 
authors who were sympathetic to experimental philosophy did not see science and theology as
the same occupation, nor did they seek to fuse theology with physics. Pace Gaukroger, they 
did not present their natural philosophy as being driven by Christian themes, but as distinct 
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from matters of faith. And, pace Cunningham, they did not employ their natural philosophy as
an extended argument for a specific view of God. Italian and English experimental 
philosophers shared the same views on how nature can be seen and uncovered, even though 
the former were mostly Catholics whereas the latter were mostly Protestants. This indicates 
that neither experimental philosophy nor seventeenth-century natural philosophy as a whole, 
as such, were theologically driven, and it raises the question of what explains the different 
attitudes of Italian and English authors on the relation between experimental philosophy and 
religion. 
In the wake of Galileo’s condemnation, several Italian novatores opted to eschew 
general questions on foundations and first principles. Some authors focused their research on 
small-scale questions that could be solved purely through detailed empirical inquiries.74 
Others focused on technical, mathematically demanding aspects of the new philosophy. An 
example is Evangelista Torricelli. He provided the inspiration for the famous experiment on 
Torricellian vacuum, but he refrained from participating in the debates on the interpretation of
the experiment, the existence of the vacuum, or the weight of the air. He devoted much time 
and energy to perfecting a technique for grinding the lenses of telescopes. Yet, he never used 
them to confirm the Copernican theory that his teacher, Galileo, had defended, nor did he ever
engage in cosmological disputes (Belloni 1975, 25–29). Torricelli adopted this attitude as 
early as the 1640s. In the 1660s, when experimental philosophy emerged, it offered a 
methodological framework that justified the choice to focus on small-scale and technical 
questions on the ground that overarching and foundational issues will be best addressed once 
a universal natural history is nearing completion. By focusing on small-scale and technical 
issues, researchers could avoid broader questions about the relevance of their work to 
theological and religious matters. They could also avoid those metaphysical questions that 
have implications for belief in the transubstantiation, the immortality of the soul, or how 
immaterial agents such as angels could act on material bodies. 
17
Experimental philosophy did not only provide a methodological framework that 
encouraged work on small-scale problems in isolation from foundational issues. It also 
offered a set of epistemic virtues that could be easily linked to Christian virtues, and it offered
data that could be used as the basis for arguments from design and claims about God’s 
benevolence. In England, Sprat and others highlighted these aspects of experimental 
philosophy. This was functional to a cultural policy that aimed to ensure the success of 
experimental philosophy by presenting it as the natural philosophical programme most suited 
to ‘the social and intellectual aspirations of the Restoration’ (Wood 1980, 1). 
Italian novatores were attracted to another aspect of experimental philosophy, namely, 
the fact that it provided a justification for pursuing technical or small-scale research in 
isolation from broader metaphysical and theological questions. This, too, was functional to a 
cultural policy. It protected the freedom of research of the novatores by minimizing the risk of
being censored by Church authorities, losing the support of patrons,75 and prompting disputes 
or smear campaigns from ecclesiastics and Peripatetics. It is not by chance that experimental 
research thrived in Bologna, where the novatores adopted this cautious attitude.76 By contrast, 
the Florentine philosopher Donato Rossetti, who was eager to respond to the Peripatetics 
point-by-point even on foundational questions, ended up leaving Tuscany and seeking a 
career elsewhere. 
All this indicates that experimental philosophy did not have an intrinsic relation with 
theological or religious views. Whether it was presented as an ally of religion or as sharply 
distinct from it was, to a significant extent, a matter of cultural politics. It depended on which 
rhetorical and argumentative strategies were believed to be most likely to enable experimental
philosophers to thrive, preserve freedom of research and gain institutional support. 
18
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